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INTRODUCTION
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran, made his way
through a sea of protest into Columbia University's Lerner Hall on
September 24, 2007, 1 to make a speech in which he would claim that
there are no homosexuals in Iran and that the Holocaust should be treated
as a theory and not fact.2 Lee C. Bollinger, president of the University,
was harshly criticized for his decision to host Ahmadinejad at the
University's World Leaders Forum3 and not all criticisms were toothless
ideological objections. New York lawmakers threatened to retaliate.
Sheldon Silver, leader of the state assembly, claimed that he would
consider taking steps to withhold Columbia's public funding to punish
the University and protest its hosting of Ahmadinejad, stating that
"Bollinger made a big mistake and there should be consequences for him
[sic] making that decision." 4  Silver criticized Bollinger for
"legitimizing" a person who "[is] clearly responsible for the death of
Americans" and "remains as much a threat to the world as anyone
today. Notably, a similar threat was made by United States
Representative Duncan Hunter on Fox News. Hunter asserted that, if
Bollinger "follows through with his hosting of the leader of Iran, I will
move in Congress to cut off every single type of federal funding to
. Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009.
1. Jacob Gershman, Legislatures May Act on Columbia: Silver Warns of
Impact on State Aid, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 24, 2007, at A5.
2. Helene Cooper & contributing reporting by Steven Lee, Ahmadinejad, at
Columbia, Parries and Puzzles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at A1
3. Gershman, supra note 1, at A5.
4. Id.
5. Id. (alteration added).
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Columbia University." 6 Hunter justified his opposition to the hosting of
Ahmadinejad by pointing to the fact that road side bombs made in Iran
and sent into Iraq have killed U.S. soldiers.7
State and federal governments have been attempting, sometimes
successfully, to regulate constitutionally protected speech through the
power of the purse for decades. However, the course of action Silver
and Hunter proposed went beyond legislation which conditions the
provision of funding on a recipient's abstention from certain speech.
Both government officials threatened retaliatory action against Columbia
for providing a forum, even an unfriendly one, 9 to a controversial
political figure. Could such government action ever be endorsed by an
American court? Or, perhaps a closer question: Could legislation which
provided for the revocation of public funds to educational institutions
that hosted, for example, "an enemy of the United States" be upheld?
This Note explores the constitutionality of the proposed actions
of Silver and Hunter and others like them by examining two possible
courses of action: (1) withholding funds from Columbia in retaliation for
hosting Ahmadinejad and (2) conditioning the provision of future
government funds to Columbia on its agreement to not host speakers like
Ahmadinejad. Part I(A) and (B) of this Note will introduce two cases
dealing with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of retaliatory action by county and
6. Fox News' Your World. Interview with Duncan Hunter (Fox News
broadcast Sep. 24, 2007), available at http://thinkprogress.org/2007/09/24/hunter-
columbia-funding/.
7. Id.
8. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding that 47
U.S.C. § 399 was unconstitutional because the government's ban on editorializing
did not serve a sufficiently compelling interest to justify a substantial abridgment of
First Amendment rights); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S.
540 (1983) (holding that 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) was constitutional because Congress
did not infringe in any First Amendment rights by withholding tax exempt status
from organizations which engage in political lobbying, it merely refused to pay for
lobbying with public funds); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (holding that the N.Y. Son of Sam
law was unconstitutional because it imposed a financial burden on certain speakers
because of the content of their speech).
9. See generally Peter Kiefer, Report: Columbia Professor to Apologize to
Ahmadinejad, N.Y. SuN, Jan. 9, 2008: Staff Reporter for the Sun, Columbia's
Bollinger Tops Time Magazine's 'Top 10 Awkward Moments' List, N.Y. SuN, Dec.
12, 2007.
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state governments and discuss the how the withholding of funds from
Columbia may be viewed under this case law. Part II will examine case
law on government subsidies and free speech. This section will explore
the reasoning and underlying facts of several United States Supreme
Court cases by using FCC v. League of Women Votersl ° as a stepping
stone leading to two more recent decisions: Simon and Schuster v. N.Y
State Crime Victims Board" and Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights.'2 Part II(D) will then discuss the Ahmadinejad
controversy given the framework provided by the preceding cases. Part
III will more thoroughly analyze the constitutional issue in light of the
two hypothetical courses of action for government actors. Finally, the
Note will argue that although the political atmosphere created by the
"war on terror" has put increasing pressure on those seeking to protect
core First Amendment principles, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
would go as far as to uphold government action such as that threatened
by Silver and Hunter.
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR RETALIATORY GOVERNMENT ACTION
A. North Mississippi Communications, Inc. v. Desoto County Board, 13
and El Dia Inc. v. Governor Pedro J. Rossello
14
North Mississippi Communications, Inc., and El Dia, Inc. v.
Governor Pedro J. Rossello both involved government's punishment of
free speech. Although these cases differ from the Columbia scenario in
that they deal with retaliation against completely private entities, they are
nevertheless relevant because they involve retaliatory government action.
They also employ a key mode of analysis in deciding the issue. Since
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle15 federal courts have had a
relatively clear test available to evaluate actions by government against
its employees. North Mississippi and El Dia indicate that courts may use
10. 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
11. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
12. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
13. 951 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1992).
14. 165 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 1999).
15. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
the test not only in the event of retaliation against an individual, but also
when faced with actions against private bodies such as the North
Mississippi Times and perhaps private universities like Columbia.
Mt. Healthy involved a teacher, who claimed that the Mt.
Healthy School Board refused to rehire him because of his criticism of a
recently distributed teachers' memorandum on a local radio show.'
6
Doyle claimed that the Board's actions infringed on his constitutionally
protected speech.17  The Court introduced a two-step analysis to
determine whether the school's firing of Doyle violated the First
Amendment. Under the first step of Mt. Healthy the burden was placed
on Doyle "to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and
that his conduct was a 'substantial factor' . . . in the Board's decision not
to rehire him."' 8 The second step shifted the burden of proof to the
school board to prove that it would have acted in the same manner had
Doyle never made the controversial remarks at issue.' 9 This test "has
become standard fare in discrimination cases.,
20
In North Mississippi, the North Mississippi Times brought suit
against the Desoto County Board alleging that the Board withheld county
advertising from the paper in retaliation for the paper's publishing
negative stories about them.2 The record indicated that in 1975 the
Times started to publish highly critical articles about the Board and that
before 1976 the Board's advertising went mostly to the Times instead of
the Olive Branch Tribune, the county's other, much smaller,
22
newspaper. The evidence at trial showed that although before 1976 the
Board had given almost no legal notices to the smaller paper, presumably
because of low circulation, by 1977 almost all legal notices were given to
the Tribune.23
The Fifth Circuit in North Mississippi, applying the Mt. Healthy
analysis, found that in order for the Board to be exonerated it would have
to prove that not one of the advertising and legal notices was withheld as
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 287.
19. Id.
20. N. Mississippi Comm. Inc. v. Jones, 951 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1992).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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punishment for the Times's critical articles.24 The Court remanded the
case to be evaluated under this standard.
El Dia also dealt with a newspaper being penalized for
publishing of articles critical of the government. In 1997 El Nueva Dia
published various articles that criticized the governor and his
25
administration for fraud and waste. On April 13, 1997, the newspaper
published an article which criticized the governor's first 100 days in his
second term, and on April 14, 1997, "eighteen government agencies that
had routinely advertised in El Nueva Dia terminated" their advertising
contracts with the paper.26
The central issue in El Dia was whether the governor could
dismiss the claims against him on grounds of qualified immunity. Under
qualified immunity, public officers are protected from liability "if their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known., 27 The Court
concluded that the governor's conduct violated clearly established
constitutional law that a reasonable person would have been aware of.
28
The reasoning set forth in these two short opinions rests on
precedent from various Supreme Court cases which established and
fortified the principle that conditioning the withdrawal of benefits in a
manner that infringes on constitutionally protected rights is
29 30
unconstitutional. In Perry v. Sinderman the Court held that a former
college professor could initiate a lawsuit against the Board of Regents
when he claimed that he was fired because of his exercise of free speech.
In 1989, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court held that a
24. N. Mississippi Comm. Inc. v. Jones, 951 F.2d 652, 656 (5th Cir. 1992).
25. El Dia v. Rosello, 165 F.3d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1999).
26. Id.
27. El Dia, 165 F.3d. at 109 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982) (emphasis added)).
28. Id. at I10.
29. See Mt. Healthy, supra note 17 and the text accompanying notes 15-19;
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that a former college professor
could initiate a lawsuit against the Board of Regents when he claimed that he was
fired because of his exercise of free speech).
30. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
31. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(holding that a defendant employer had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that his firing of the plaintiff was not an act of discrimination).
2008]
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defendant employer had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
his firing of the plaintiff was not an act of discrimination. Taking these
two cases together, North Mississippi adds the Mt. Healthy analysis to
the framework while El Dia makes the symbolic point that retaliatory
actions such as the Governor's will may be deemed clearly
unconstitutional, not only to public officials, but also to a reasonable
person.
B. Sheldon Silver and Duncan Hunter under Mt. Healthy
The New York legislature and the United States Congress have
options when it comes to showing disapproval of Columbia and
Bollinger. This section will analyze how the withholding of funds from
Columbia would be treated by a reviewing court.
It is beyond question that both legislatures have the authority to
defund Columbia. Neither the state 32 nor federal constitutions put the
legislature under an obligation to fund institutions of higher education.
Nevertheless, cases such as Legal Services Corp. v. Velaquez,33 FEC v.
Mass. Right to Life,34 and Speiser v. Randal?5 demonstrate that
government cannot unconstitutionally withhold funds simply because an
entity is not entitled to them in first place.
A successful attempt by Sheldon Silver or Duncan Hunter, acting
as representatives of their respective government bodies, to withhold
public funds from Columbia would most likely be found
unconstitutional. As the Constitution does confer on Bollinger the right
36
to invite Ahmadinejad to Columbia, it seems highly unlikely that if the
New York Legislature or Congress elected to take this route their actions
32. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 358.
33. 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that a provision of the Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act, which limited arguments that
recipient lawyers were allowed to make on behalf of their indigent clients, violated
the First Amendment).
34. 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that a law 2 U.S.C. § 441(b), which
prohibited corporations from using treasury funds in connection with election events,
unconstitutionally infringed on free speech).
35. 357 U.S. 513 (1953) (holding that a statute that required veterans to take an
oath that they did not advocate the overthrow of the government in order to get a
property tax exemption unconstitutionally infringed in free speech).
36. See infra, text accompanying note 142.
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would be upheld. The Mt. Healthy test would almost certainly be
deemed apt analysis given the retaliatory nature of government's actions.
If a court did choose to evaluate the revocation of funds under Mt.
Healthy, the government would be unlikely to prevail. Columbia would
be faced with proving that the refusal to fund was retaliatory in nature.
Statements such as those made to the press by Silver and Hunter would
be extremely probative, especially given Silver's comment to the New
York Sun that, "Bollinger made a big mistake and there should be
• • • ,,37
consequences for him making that decision, Columbia would likely
satisfy the first prong of the test. Under Mt. Healthy, the burden would
then shift to the state legislature or Congress to prove that the
withholding would have taken place even if Ahmadinej ad had never been
invited. Again, in light of statements made by both men to the press,
Columbia would most likely prevail. El Dia tells us that if Silver and
Duncan were identified as the force behind the firing, the court would
ask if either of their actions would be seen as unconstitutional to a
reasonable person. If the answer is yes, neither official would be given
qualified immunity.
II. FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY CASE LAW ON SPEECH AND SUBSIDIES
Part II of this Note will provide the framework to implement
when analyzing Silver and Hunter's second hypothetical course of
action-drafting legislation which would condition the provision of
future government funds to Columbia on its agreement not to host
speakers like Ahmadinejad. I will describe three principle cases in order
to shed light on how the Court has approached similar legislation in the
past. Each case stands for important principles that are relevant to the
free speech implications of hypothetical number two. In FCC v. League
of Women Voters (League of Women Voters)38 the Court highlighted the
paramount importance of the protection of editorial speech. In Simon &
Schuster v. NY State Crime Victims Board (Simon & Schuster)39 the
Court made clear that speech's offensive nature does not justify its
37. Gershman, supra note 1, at A5.
38. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
39. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
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suppression. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights
40
is an example of the current Court's approach to free speech challenges
in the peculiar arena of national security.
A. FCC v. League of Women Voters
The United States Supreme Court in League of Women Voters
was faced with determining the constitutionality of § 399 of the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967 (Act).4" The Act created the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting (CPB) which would be responsible for distributing
funds "to noncommercial television and radio stations in support of
station operations and educational programming., 42 The challenge in
League of Women Voters came from a grant recipient constrained by §
399, which prohibited noncommercial educational stations from
engaging in editorializing.43
Because the ban on editorializing burdened free speech, as
protected under the First Amendment, the Court evaluated the legislation
under strict scrutiny, demanding that the legislation be narrowly tailored
and in service of a compelling government interest.44 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, stressed the importance of First Amendment
protection of editorial speech, considered the drafting of the Act and
subsequent amendments made thereto, and then concluded that the
provision failed to satisfy strict scrutiny on several counts.45
The government and its counsel 46 claimed § 399's ban on
editorializing served to ensure that programs funded by the federal
government could not be coerced into engaging in propaganda which
would serve governmental interests,47 and to prevent local stations from
becoming an outlet for the opinions of station managers and other private
40. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
41. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
42. Id. at 366 (citing Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-129, 81 Stat.
365, 47 U.S.C. § 399 et seq.).
43. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 399).
44. Id. at 380 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377
(1969)).
45. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 395.
46. Samuel Alito
47. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 372 (1984).
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groups. The Court accepted the importance of these goals and
recognized Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
broadcast communication,49 but stressed that § 399 was directed at "the
expression of editorial opinion" and that this form of speech "lies at the
heart of First Amendment protection. ' 5°  Justice Brennan's opinion
repeatedly articulated this principal and demonstrated its venerable and
permanent presence in judicial philosophy by citing various past
Supreme Court decisions.5' Most relevant was the Court's emphasis on
its earlier decision in Thornhill v. Alabama.52 In Thornhill, the Court
stated that the First Amendment protected "the liberty to discuss
publically and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous
restraint or fear of subsequent punishment."
53
The Court's second stated objection to § 399 was that the ban
was aimed at speech's content and consequently appeared to seek to
"limit discussion of controversial topics" and "shape the agenda for
public debate. 54 When facing First Amendment challenges the Court
has distinguished between "laws which impose burdens on some speech
on the basis of the ideas or view expressed" and "laws which impose
burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed.
55
Laws which burden speech according to its content have been coined
"content based." Content-based restrictions on speech have been
rigorously scrutinized by the Supreme Court since League of Women
Voters.56 Justice Brennan said: "The prevailing assumption, reflected in
48. Id. at 396.
49. Id. at 376-77.
50. Id. at 381.
51. Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co. v. Minnesota Comm. of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983); First Nat'l. Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 766-67
(1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
101-02 (1940).
52. 310 U.S. at 101-02.
53. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 372 (1984) (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)) (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 384.
55. Jendi Reiter, Serial Killer Trading Cards and First Amendment Values: A
Defense of Content-Based Regulation of Violent Expression, 62 ALB. L. REV. 183,
184 (1998).
56. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (granting a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act stating that
SPEE CH A ND S UB SIDIES 29320081
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both popular debate and constitutional jurisprudence, is that core
American values would be threatened if the government distinguished
between true and false, high-value and low-value, or socially useful and
harmful expression. 57 Justice Brennan justified the need for such
rigorous analysis by pointing to the risk that such a ban may allow "the
government to control ... the political search for truth,, 58 thus arguing
that the government's ban created the risk that it claimed it was seeking
to avoid. 59
Justice Brennan then looked behind the Act for congressional
intent and discovered that § 399 was not part of the administration's
original proposal and was not included in the initial version passed by the
Senate.6° Justice Brennan also cited legislative history that indicated that
for some members of Congress the motivating factor behind including
§399 was to prevent criticism of the government on these stations.
Representative Springer, a leading proponent of the provision,6 1
articulated his concerns by stating "[t]here are some of us who have very
strong feelings because they have been editorialized against.,
62
Justice Brennan then moved to explain why the provision failed
to meet the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny analysis. He
deemed § 399 overinclusive because "editorializing," especially by local
stations funded by CPB, includes a very broad category of speech which
may have nothing to do with government. Brennan asserts, "[i]ndeed,
although the government's interest in the protection of minors was compelling, the
Act's criminalizing of commercial internet postings that were harmful to minors was
not the least restrictive means of serving Congress's objective); R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that the St. Paul Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance was
unconstitutional because it prohibited speech solely based on the subjects the speech
addressed); Simon & Schuster v. NY State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105
(1991) (holding that a NY's Son of Sam law, which required a publisher which
contracted with a convicted person to submit a copy of the contract and turn over all
income derived from the contract to the NY State Crime Victims Board was
unconstitutional because it was imposing a financial burden on speech based on the
speech's content).
57. Reiter, supra note 55, at 183.
58. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984) (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y. 447 U.S. 530 (1980)).
59. See supra text accompanying note 47-48.
60. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 387 (1984).
61. Id. at 387, n.18.
62. Id. (alteration added).
the breadth of editorial commentary is as wide as human imagination
permits. '63  He mentions, for example, that a local station's urging
improvements to a town park or museum would be prohibited under §
399.64
Finally, § 399 contains yet another fatal flaw-underinclusivity.
Because the provision is only aimed at noncommercial stations which
receive funding from CPB, it leaves a broad spectrum of programs,
which also receive CPB funding, free to nationally broadcast editorial
commentary.65 Due to their wide audience, these programs are much
more likely to catch the attention of Congress and perhaps be retaliated
against.
66
The majority opinion concludes with consideration of the
government's asserted interests. The Court implied that given both the
under- and overinclusivity of the provision, it had doubts as to the
67
genuineness of the interests presented. It reasoned that if these
noncommercial stations were truly free, as the government contended, to
broadcast controversial views, and select interviewees, then it is hardly
plausible that § 399 truly serves to keep partisan or controversial
opinions from being presented.68 The Court said: "[Section] 399 does
not prevent the use of noncommercial stations for the presentation of
views on partisan matters; instead, it merely bars a station from
specifically communicating such views on its own behalf . ,,69 In
sum, because the stated government interests were not functionally
served by § 399 and because other provisions of the Act adequately
served to protect these government interests, the provision was found to
be not only unconstitutional, but also unnecessary. This analysis
demonstrates that the Court will look behind a government's stated
interests to see what is really driving legislation. If what the Court sees as
the government's genuine interest isn't substantially weighty, the
legislation will fail strict scrutiny.
63. Id. at 393 (alteration added).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 391.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 396 (citing First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
793 (1978)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 397.
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In League of Women Voters, the Court conceded very little and
held that § 399's ban unconstitutionally infringed on First Amendment
rights. The case is an excellent example of the rigorous analysis
implemented by the Court when First Amendment freedoms are at stake
and content-based restrictions are in question. The key lesson from
League of Women Voters is that if an abridgment of political speech is
implicated, strict scrutiny will be used in analysis.
Significantly, Justices Rehnquist, White, and Stevens dissent.
One might infer that the stance of Rehnquist, the author of the dissent,
may be more in step with the conservative Court of today. In his dissent
Rehnquist emphasizes the fact that the government is providing aid to
these stations and has the right to choose to spend public funds in any
70manner it deems appropriate. Since League of Women Voters, Justice
Rehnquist put forth this principle again in Rust v. Sullivan.7 1 Rust
involved a provision of the Public Health Service Act which prohibited
recipients of Title X funds from using those "funds in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning., 72 The Court in Rust stressed
that the government may choose to fund "one activity at the exclusion of
another; a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental constitutional right does not infringe the right . . .,7
Under this line of reasoning, a government could place any conditions on
it provision of public funds, as long as the potential recipient was not
constitutionally entitled to them. Fortunately, since Rust there have been
numerous decisions which have demonstrated that this principle is far
from absolute.74
70. Id. at 403 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
71. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
72. Id. at 191 (quoting Title X of the Public Health Service Act).
73. Id. at 193.
74. See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that
a provision of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act, which
limited arguments that recipient lawyers were allowed to make on behalf of their
indigent clients, violated the First Amendment); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life Inc.,
479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that a law, 2 U.S.C. § 441(b), which prohibited
corporations from using treasury funds in connection with election events,
unconstitutionally infringed on free speech); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1953)
(holding that a statute that required veterans to take a loyalty oath in order to get a
property tax exemption unconstitutionally infringed on free speech).
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In League of Women Voters, the Court held that § 399's ban
unconstitutionally infringed on First Amendment rights. The case is an
excellent example of the merciless analysis implemented by the Court
when First Amendment freedoms are at stake and content based
restrictions are in question. From League of Women Voters, one
undoubtedly takes that if an abridgment of political speech is implicated,
strict scrutiny will be used in analysis.
B. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Board75
Although Simon & Schuster does not deal with government
funding, it is relevant to this Note when one considers its implications on
Columbia's situation. The fact that a large portion of society sees
Ahmadinej ad as a reprehensible enemy of the United States and finds his
words to be outrageous and hurtful adds another element to the Columbia
political speech controversy. The public's perception of Ahmadinejad
and the effect that his political identity and social beliefs may have on a
court cannot be ignored. In Simon & Schuster these societal perceptions
and underlying moral judgments were in play as well.
Simon & Schuster arose in the southern district of New York as a
challenge to the state's Son of Sam law.76 The law was enacted in 1977
and provided "that an accused or convicted criminal's income from
works describing his crime be deposited in an escrow account. These
funds [were] then made available to the victims of the crime and the
criminal's other creditors. 77 The stated purpose of the statute was to
"ensure that monies received by the criminal under such circumstances
shall first be made available to recompense the victims of that crime for
their loss and suffering. 78 Under the law, the definition of "a person
convicted of a crime" included people who had admitted to the
commissioning of a crime but who were never prosecuted. 79 The case
first began in 1986 when the Board became aware that Simon & Schuster
75. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
76. NY Exec. Law § 632(a)(1), invalidated by Simon & Shuster, 502 U.S. 105
(1991).
77. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108 (alteration added).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 110.
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had contracted with organized crime figure, Henry Hill.80  Hill had
worked with Nicholas Pileggi from 1981 until 1986 to create the non-
fiction work Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family.81 The work was later
adapted into the motion picture Goodfellas.82
Upon learning of the contractual relationship between Hill and
Simon & Schuster, the Board demanded that Hill turn over all proceeds
which had already been received and ordered Simon & Schuster to give
83all future proceeds intended for Hill to the Board. In response Simon &
Schuster brought suit claiming that the Son of Sam law violated the First
Amendment and sought an injunction against its enforcement.84 The
District Court found that there was no constitutional violation and the
85Court of Appeals affirmed.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, first pointed to the
established presumption that a "statute is presumptively inconsistent with
the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech." 86 Like Justice Brennan, Justice
O'Connor stressed that it is imperative that the First Amendment protect
the people from a government that attempts to "drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace" by imposing "content-based burdens
on speech.' '87 This law only burdened income which was derived from a
very specific type of work. Thus, whether or not the work falls under the
statute was determined by its content. 88 The legislation of hypothetical
number two-the conditioning of future funding-would most likely be
deemed content based.
89
Because the Son of Sam law was deemed to discriminate based
on content, the Court evaluated the law under strict scrutiny.9 In United
80. Id. at 111.
81. Id. at 112.
82. Id. at 114.
83. Id. at 115.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Leathers v. Medlock 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
87. Id. at 116.
88. Id.
89. See infra Part II(D).
90. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Board, 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
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States v. Eichman9 1 the Court made clear that avoiding the presentation
of an idea that may be found offensive by society does not constitute a
compelling state interest, 92 a statement very relevant to the hypothetical
legislation. To avoid the content-based label, instead of presenting the
government interest as preventing the glorification of crime, the Board
focused more on the victim and perpetrator than on the content of the
work. The Court stated that its interest was in "ensuring that criminals
do not profit from storytelling about their crimes before their victims
have a meaningful opportunity to be compensated for their injuries."
93
Again, the Court questioned the authenticity of this stated interest, asking
why not grant all of the criminal's assets to their victim, 94 thereby
questioning the authenticity of the stated interest and implying that this
interest had a tenuous connection with what the law functionally
accomplished.
As in League of Women Voters, the statute was also condemned
for overinclusivity. 95 Justice O'Connor criticized the law's inclusion of
"works of any subject, provided that they express the author's thoughts
or recollections about his crime" 96 and the law's definition of "person
convicted of crime." This definition, the Court emphasized, "enables the
Board to escrow the income of any author who admits in his work to
having committed a crime whether or not the author was even actually
ever accused or convicted., 97 These two aspects of the law implicate a
very large body of work. 98 Justice O'Connor mentioned authors such as
Malcolm X, Thoreau, and Martin Luther King Jr. as individuals whose
works would be implicated under this law.
99
Due to the Board's failure to present a compelling government
interest and the overinclusivity of the law, the majority struck down the
Son of Sam law. Although the law at issue served to punish "the bad"
91. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
92. Id. at 319.
93. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 119.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 121.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 121.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 121-22.
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and compensate the afflicted, it did not pass constitutional muster. The
suspect nature of content based restrictions on speech was reaffirmed.
Given the rhetoric put forth in Simon & Schuster and League of
Women Voters, a substantial and unquestionably genuine interest would
have to be at stake to justify enacting a clearly content-based regulation
of free speech. In order to prevent speakers such as Ahmadinejad from
expressing their beliefs in public, content-based regulations would most
likely be necessary.
C. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. 100
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights
[FAIR] 10 came thirty years after League of Women Voters, ten after
Simon & Schuster, and involved a very different set of circumstances
then them both. At issue in Rumsfeld was 10 U.S.C.S. § 983, the
Solomon Amendment. The Solomon Amendment (Amendment), as
originally adopted, prohibited institutions of higher education from
refusing or in effect preventing military recruiters "from gaining entry to
campuses."' 10 The Amendment posed a challenge to members of an
association of law schools who wished to restrict military recruiters'
access out of a desire to protest the Congress's policies regarding
homosexuals in the military. 103
Some law schools had previously skirted the Amendment by
having military recruiters conduct interviews on their undergraduate
campuses. 04  However, after September 11, 2001, the Department of
Defense (DOD) "adopted an informal policy of requiring universities to
provide military recruiters access to students equal in quality and scope
to that provided to other recruiters."' 0 5 This interpretation prohibited law
schools from directing military recruiters to their undergraduate
campuses. FAIR objected to DOD's interpretation and sought a
100. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
101. FAIR is an organization of law schools and faculties "whose mission is
'to promote academic freedom and to support educational institutions in opposing
discrimination... . '" Id. at 52.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 53.
105. Id.
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preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Amendment. 106 The
district court denied FAIR's request for a preliminary injunction holding
that FAIR "failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its
First Amendment claims" and that "the inclusion of an unwanted
periodic visitor did not significantly affect" the law schools' ability to
exercise their First Amendment Rights. 107
While the district court rejected FAIR's constitutional claims, it
disagreed with DOD's new interpretation of the Amendment. DOD
responded to this disagreement by codifying its equal access policy.
After this codification the Amendment further specified that "if any part
of an institution of higher education denies military recruiters access
equal to that provided to other recruiters, the entire institution would lose
certain federal funds."'
08
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a unanimous court which upheld
the Solomon Amendment. In his opinion, Roberts pointed to Congress's
"broad and sweeping [power]" to raise armies, 10 9 discussed why the
Amendment is consistent with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine," 10
stressed that the Amendment regulates conduct and not speech,' and
analyzed the question of whether the Amendment violates freedom of
• • 112
association.
The Court pointed to it decision in Rostker v. Goldberg"13 to
highlight the principle that "judicial deference [] is at its apogee" 114 when
Congress is legislating under its duty to raise and support armies. 1 '
Chief Justice Roberts implied that Congress could have chosen to
directly mandate that military recruiters be provided equal access to all
universities, and with subtle approval, pointed to the fact that they
instead chose to meet their objective through use of the Spending
106. Id. at 52.
107. Id. at 53.
108. Id. at 51.
109. Id. at 58 (quoting U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 US. 367, 377 (1968)) (alteration
added).
110. Id. at 59.
111. Id. at60.
112. Id. at68.
113. 435 U.S. 57 (1981) (alteration added).
114. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006).
115. Id.
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Clause. l 16 He went on to state that the chosen congressional action
arguably deserved more deference since it granted universities a choice:
forego federal funding, or provide military recruiters equal access to your
campus. He did however go on to recognize that this so-called
"choice" is not enough to ensure constitutionality.118
The Court then reasoned that since the Amendment neither
"limits what law schools may say, nor requires them to say anything,"
1 19
their constitutional right to free speech had not been violated. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit had come to the opposite conclusion. It
concluded that forcing institutions to host military recruiters amounted to
compelled speech. 12  Its basic analysis was that by being forced to
accommodate these recruiters, these institutions were effectively being
forced to speak "the Government's message."' 121 In addition, unlike the
Supreme Court, the Third Circuit reasoned that even if it is conduct and
not speech that is being regulated, this conduct is expressive and should
therefore be protected under the First Amendment. 122
Chief Justice Roberts addressed each of the Court of Appeals'
arguments and concluded that while precedent undoubtedly established
that compelled speech violates the First Amendment, accommodation of
military recruiters did not amount to compelled speech. He drew a
distinction between speech that is incidental to the requirements of
certain legislation, like the speech pointed to by the Court of Appeals,
and legislation that dictates the content of speech. 24  For example,
"[c]ompelling a law school that sends scheduling emails for other
recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is simply not the same as
forcing a student to pledge allegiance. ,,125
After concluding that the Solomon Amendment did not burden
free speech, Chief Justice Roberts then turned to the argument that the
116. Id.
117. Id. at 58-59.
118. Id.at 60.
119. Id. at 59.
120. Id. at 60.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 60-61.
123. Id. at 61-65.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 65 (alteration added).
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Amendment burdened expressive conduct which merits First
Amendment protection. 26 He specified that the Court has extended First
Amendment protection to "conduct that is inherently expressive"'127 and
came to the conclusion that the conduct proscribed by the Amendment
did not meet this threshold requirement, stating that denying military
recruiters access to a law school campus was not sufficiently expressive
conduct. It would not be "overwhelmingly apparent"'' 28 to an observer
that by doing this, a law school was expressing its views on military
policy. 129
The last argument addressed in the Rumsfeld opinion is that
forcing a law school to provide equal access to military recruiters
violates that law school's freedom of association. In its briefs and
arguments FAIR had relied heavily on the Court's precedent in BSA v.
Dale. 30 In Dale the Court held that New Jersey's public accommodation
laws, which required the Boy Scouts to accept a homosexual scout
master, violated the Boy Scouts' freedom of association.' 3' The Court
distinguished Rumsfeld from Dale by distinguishing military recruiters
from scoutmasters, and arrived at the conclusion that recruiters, unlike
scoutmasters, do not become members of the group's expressive
association. Therefore, unlike New Jersey's public accommodation
laws, the Solomon Amendment does not require a group to accept
members into its community and therefore does not violate the First
Amendment. 133
Many rules and exceptions come out of the Rumsfeld opinion:
(1) Congress may place reasonable conditions on its provision of aid so
long as these conditions do not infringe on freedom of speech, but one
must keep in mind that maximum deference is due to Congress when
they are operating under their authority to build an army; (2) government
compelled speech violates the First Amendment, but only if the
government is mandating the content of speech or if that speech is
126. Id
127. Id. at 66 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).
128. Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
129. Id. at 66.
130. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
131. Id. at68.
132. Id. at 68-69.
133. Id. at 69.
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affecting a message the complaining speaker is trying to convey - not if
the required speech is merely incidental to the government policy; 13 4 (3)
the First Amendment does protect conduct, but that conduct must be
"inherently expressive and "overwhelmingly apparent"; 136 and (4) the
First Amendment protects freedom of association, but freedom of
association only protects individuals from being forced to admit someone
into their "expressive association."
On a broader note, Rumsfeld cites precedents to fit the Solomon
Amendment somewhere along the spectrum of free speech cases. What
stands out in opinions like Rumsfeld, is how vulnerable to manipulation
precedent is. Couldn't a military recruiter who visits a law school
multiple times a year, spending days at a time with the school's students
and staff, be considered within the law school's "expressive
association?" Is the speech compelled by the Solomon Amendment truly
incidental to the law? Is even more deference owed to Congress when
they are operating under their authority to build and support armies when
our country is at war? With so many potential factors at play and no
decipherable rule to guide us, predictions are very difficult to make.
Fortunately, cases such as North Mississippi and El Dia do hint at a rule
against retaliatory action as punishment for the exercise of First
Amendment rights.
D. Silver and Hunter under Strict Scrutiny
The three cases discussed above each address important aspects
of potential conflicts which may arise in contexts similar to that of
Ahmadinejad and Columbia. League of Women Voters puts a broad
prohibition conditioning government funding on an entity's promise not
to engage in editorializing. Simon & Schuster highlights the principle
that the expression of offensive ideas cannot be regulated simply because
this expression may be insulting or even hateful to society. Rumfeld adds
an important caveat. Despite the significance of First Amendment
protections, in some circumstances, specifically circumstances
implicating national security, the protection of these rights may be
134. Id. at 67.
135. See supra note 127.
136. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006).
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relegated to second place. Readers of Rumsfeld may object to this
characterization pointing to the numerous other reasons Chief Justice
Roberts offered for upholding the regulation, but one cannot ignore the
first argument proffered by the Chief Justice: congressional authority is
at its most unquestionable when acting in its capacity to raise and support
an army. 3 7 One can certainly imagine that congressional authority may
also be "at its apogee"1 38 when acting to secure our nation against foreign
threats. This consideration could be deemed completely irrelevant in the
case of Columbia and Silver because in that case we are dealing with the
actions of a state legislature which plays a very minimal role in national
security. Do state governments have any recognizable interest in acting
to ensure the security of their citizens against foreign threats? If they do,
this interest is certainly far less established than the federal government
interest at issue in Rumsfeld. An asserted interest in homeland security
would undoubtedly be more credible coming from Congressman Hunter.
If the New York legislature or the U.S. Congress responded to
Bollinger's actions by enacting a law that prohibited entities which
receive government funds from "hosting enemies of the United States,"
the most likely method of analysis would be strict scrutiny. Facially, this
restriction on speech would be conditioned on the identity of the speaker,
not the content of his speech. Functionally the regulation would have the
same implications of a content based restriction and would presumably
trigger the merciless analysis used in cases like Simon & Schuster and
League of Women Voters.
III. APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK AND POLITICAL CLIMATE TO
COLUMBIA AND AHMADINEJAD
Fortunately for Columbia it seems that Sheldon Silver and
Duncan Hunter have chosen not to act on their threats or have been
prevented from doing so. Although neither has managed to punish
Columbia, their words should not be dismissed as overblown rhetoric.
As recent cases such as North Mississippi and El Dia demonstrate,
retaliatory government action is a very real phenomenon.
137. Id.
138. Id.
20081 SPEECH AND SUBSIDIES 305
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
Before looking to the threats and actions of Silver and Hunter,
this Note must first address whether President Bollinger was exercising
his and Columbia's First Amendment rights when he chose to invite
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to speak on Columbia's campus. Is this
invitation an exercise of Columbia's free speech? If there were no
constitutional implications here, then there will be no challenge to
Silver's potential withdrawal of state funds.
As Rumsfeld tells us, conduct can be considered free speech as
long as that conduct is "inherently expressive.' 39 The Court in Texas v.
Johnson'4° stated that "conduct may be sufficiently imbued with the
element of communication to fall within the scope of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments."' 141 Bollinger has stated that "in order to fulfill
Columbia's mission he must respect the rights of [Columbia's] faculty
and deans 'to create programming for academic purposes."' He added
"this will [on occasion] bring us into contact with beliefs many, most, or
even all of us will find offensive and even odious."' 42  Could the
invitation been seen as the University's expression of its "mission," as
Bollinger refers to it? Or, alternatively, is an invitation to someone to
come and express their ideas "inherently expressive conduct?" Both
formulations implicate freedom of speech. Undeniably, one of a
university's most fundamental duties is to provide a venue for the
expression of a broad array of viewpoints and to expose its students and
its community to the diversity this fosters. Punishing a university for
executing this duty, or burdening its ability to promote a free exchange
of ideas, would certainly be considered both an infringement of free
speech and an act contrary to public policy.
By examining the very small handful of cases described in this
Note, one can see that conditionally withholding something from an
entity in a manner which forces it to give up a freedom granted by the
Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional. In none of the cases
discussed did the Court find that the government interest at stake was so
strong as to justify the infringement on speech. Although strict scrutiny
is the Court's most exacting test, it is possible for a law to withstand this
139. See supra note 127.
140. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
141. Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
142. See Gershman, supra note 1.
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analysis. 43 If a court found that an institution's inviting a speaker like
Ahmadinejad to speak, was indeed an exercise of a First Amendment
right, the government forbidding that speech would have to produce a
compelling government interest which could only be served by this
prohibition. What potential interest could be served by prohibiting an
extremely controversial figure like Ahmadinejad from speaking? Given
that preventing speech which insults society has been deemed an
illegitimate interest, 144 the most compelling interest either Silver or
Hunter could offer would most likely be ensuring the safety of the
American people. 
145
143. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
666 (1990) (holding that a campaign finance act that prohibited corporations from
using corporate treasury funds to support or oppose a candidate did not
unconstitutionally burden free speech because the state's interest in "eliminating
from the political process the corrosive effect of political war chests amassed with
the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations" was sufficiently compelling
and the provision sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny); Am. Party of
Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (holding that Texas had a compelling state
interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process and that Tex. Elec. Code
art. 13.02 was narrowly tailored to serve that purpose); see also Hobbs v. County of
Westchester, 397 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that New York had a compelling
interest in protecting children from sexual predators and that Executive Order 3-
2003 was narrowly tailored to serve that interest); Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v.
Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that California demonstrated a
compelling state interest in informing voters of the identity of individuals who have
spent money in support of or in opposition to ballot measures and that its definition
of "contribution" was sufficiently narrowly tailored).
144. See, e.g., U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (explaining "that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable").
145. The fact that Ahmadinejad's speech was clearly offensive would
undoubtedly be deemed an insufficient interest. No case better demonstrates the
principle that offensive content cannot be regulated than R.A. V. v. St. Paul In R.A. V.
the petitioner had allegedly burned a cross on the lawn of an African American
family's home. The petitioner moved to dismiss the charge asserting that St. Paul's
Bias-Motivated Crime statute was an unconstitutional content-based restriction on
free speech. The Supreme Court granted the motion saying that the "First
Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech . . . or even
expressive conduct. . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed." 505 U.S. 377,
382 (1992).
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CONCLUSION
Our country's recent history has shown that when faced with
issues of homeland security, some of America's most revered principles
fall by the wayside. 146  One can see an interplay between homeland
security and statutory interpretation in Rumsfeld when the DOD
broadened the commands of the Solomon Amendment after the events of
September 1 1th. Nevertheless, some rationale would have to be
advanced in order to characterize the invitation of Ahmadinejad to speak
at a university as a threat to American security and, as stated above, the
United States Congress has a greater interest at stake than the New York
legislature. One could contend that providing a forum to leaders like
Ahmadinejad emboldens our enemies, and therefore endangers the
United States. Recent events in our history make this rationalization
more likely to be accepted than it may have been in the past. However,
neither Silver nor Hunter ever implied that he objected to the invitation
out of a concern for safety. The primary thrust of both arguments to the
press was that Columbia should not "legitimize" such a despicable figure
by providing him with a forum. In light of this statement, proving the
authenticity of a government interest in public safety may be
challenging.
Another relevant principle emphasized in Rumsfeld is that
"judicial deference is at its apogee" when Congress is acting under its
duty to raise and support armies. 147 As stated supra, one might infer that
a court may be willing to extend this deference to cases where a
legislature is acting to "protect the United States from foreign enemies"
or to "keep New York safe."1 48 A drawback to this argument is that a
legislature has no textual constitutional duty to protect the United States
146. See generally David E. Sanger, Congress and Courts try to Restore
Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 14, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/washing
ton/14course.html; see also Studs Terkel, Op-Ed., The Wiretap this Time, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/29/opinion/29terkel.html;
Thomas J. Romig & Donald J. Guter, Letter to the Editor, Ambiguity that Dishonors
America, WASH. POST., Nov. 8, 2007 at A26; Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and
the Nature of Executive Authority: The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional
Change, 72 BROOK L. REv. 871 (2007).
147. See supra note 114.
148. Id.
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from terrorism. Nevertheless, the American public may support such a
rationale out of fear. Jurisprudentially, it could be supported by those
advocating the importance of judicial restraint-given their resources
and expertise, the legislature is certainly in a better position to assess
threats to the safety of Americans than the judiciary.
The Supreme Court has come a long way since its opinion in
League of Women Voters. Indeed, the government counsel in that case is
now a member of the bench. The only other current Justice that was
present during the League of Women Voters decision is Justice Stevens,
who joined in Rehnquist's dissent. Recent cases other than Rumsfeld
may seem to some to suggest that the Roberts court gives less than
appropriate deference to First Amendment freedoms. 49 Although the
Supreme Court may seem increasingly willing to sacrifice constitutional
rights in the name of homeland security and judicial restraint, it remains
far from upholding a retaliatory revocation of funding such as that
threatened by Sheldon Silver and Duncan Hunter. After the statements
made by Silver and Hunter to the press, a revocation of Columbia's
149. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that a district
attorney's speech was not protected by the First Amendment because he was making
statements pursuant to his official duties and not speaking as a citizen); see also
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (holding that school officials did not
violate a student's First Amendment rights when they suspended him for displaying
a banner which appeared to advocate drug use. The Court stated that the "substantial
disruption" rule established by precedent was not the only basis for restricting
student speech.); Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007) (holding
that a Washington state law which prohibited unions from spending agency shop
fees of a non-member for election related purposes did not implicate the First
Amendment because unions are not constitutionally entitled to receive these fees);
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (holding that a regulation which prohibited
dangerous inmates from having access to newspapers, magazines, and personal
photographs does not violate the First Amendment; the Court reversed the Third
Circuit, saying that they did not grant sufficient deference to the judgment of prison
officials). But see FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (holding
that § 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which made it a federal crime for
any corporation to broadcast, shortly before an election, any advertisement which is
aimed at the electorate and names a candidate, unconstitutionally infringed First
Amendment rights); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (holding that Vermont's
campaign finance statute's limits on expenditures and contributions were
inconsistent with the First Amendment. The Court stated that the statute was not
narrowly tailored to serve Vermont's asserted interest in deterring corruption or the
appearance of corruption.).
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government dollars would likely be subjected to a Mt. Healthy analysis,
and a statute similar to the one proffered above would be subjected to
strict scrutiny. Silver and Hunter's burdens under Mt. Healthy would be
considerable. If strict scrutiny were applied to a restriction on public
speakers, and the safety of the American people was the stated
government interest, the policy would have to be deemed overinclusive
in light of the manner in which the narrow tailoring requirement was
interpreted and applied in League of Women and Simon and Schuster.
The link between allowing a leader such as Ahmadinejad to speak and
putting American lives in danger, is simply too unconvincing to satisfy
the Court's most demanding test. Even if the Court were to see this issue
as a closer question than this Note anticipates, Chief Justice Roberts
recently acknowledged that "the First Amendment requires [the Court] to
err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing
it.,,150
Perhaps Silver and Hunter made their statements to the New York
Sun in a fit of rage or perhaps they seriously believed that withholding
funds from Columbia University was a viable response. Whatever the
case, one may take these threats as an excuse to pontificate on the
dwindling respect our government seems to hold for the most cherished
principles of the Constitution, or to forecast the rise of an American
police state. Whether or not these concerns are generally valid, in the
case of Silver, Hunter, Bollinger, and Ahmadinejad one can glean hope
from the relevant case law. As long as content-based restrictions on
speech and retaliatory government action are scrutinized according to
established constitutional tests such as Mt. Healthy and strict scrutiny, it
will take a drastic departure from precedent for a court to condone
actions such as those threatened by Sheldon Silver and Duncan Hunter.
A broader point to take from this scenario is that while certain
areas of freedom of speech precedent seem to come and go, the most
fundamental principles arise in every opinion. The presumption against
content-based restrictions on speech and the constitutional protection
afforded to free expression of editorial opinion are examples of
principles that have been in our jurisprudence for decades and are likely
to remain. What is left to be seen is whether they will be chipped away in
150. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007) (alteration
added).
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the face of what may be seen as more legitimate concerns for national
security, or if the Mt. Healthy analysis and strict scrutiny will continue to
demand the utmost from American law and lawmakers.
